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Environmental Racism and
Biased Methods of Risk Assessment
Daniel C. Wigley & Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette*
In 1982, Reverend Benjamin Chavis, executive director of the
United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ) was
arrested for blocking the path of trucks carrying toxic PCBs to a newly
designated hazardous-waste landfill near a small southern town of
predominately black residents. In 1987, a milestone CRJ report showed
that the most significant determining factor in the siting of hazardous
waste facilities, nationwide, was race. Also, a National Law Journal
article concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
took 20% longer to identify Superfund sites in minority communities
and that polluters of those neighborhoods paid fines 50% as large as
1
polluters of white communities.
Introduction
Many studies support the CRJ conclusions. U.S. minorities
disadvantaged in terms of education, income and occupation bear a
disproportionate environmental risk. 2 Socioeconomically deprived
*
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1 Jonathan King, A Pace at the Table, Sierra 78, June 1993, at 51-58 and 90-91.
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(Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds. 1992) and Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and
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groups are more likely than affluent whites to live near polluting
facilities, 3 eat contaminated fish 4 and be employed at risky
occupations. 5 Because minorities are statistically more likely to be
economically

disadvantaged,

"environmental racism"

many

researchers

assert

that

racial bias in imposing environmental threats
6
is the central cause of disparities in risks that minorities face.
Indeed, some have argued that race is an independent factor, not
reducible to socioeconomic status, in predicting the distribution of air
-

pollution, contarfiinated fish consumption, municipal landfills and
incinerators, abandoned toxic waste dumps and lead poisoning in
children. 7 Yet, whether race or socioeconomic status is the main cause
of such inequities is still debated. Because they are more likely to be
2 Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality
(1990); Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots (Robert D.
Bullard ed. 1993); Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of
Color (Robert D. Bullard ed. 1994) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Environmental Equity: Reducing Risks for All Communities (1992).
3 See Jay M. Gould, Quality of Life in American Neighborhoods, Levels of
Affluence, Toxic Waste, and Cancer Mortality in Residential Zip Code Areas (1986);
Toxic Wastes and Race, supra; Dumping in Dixie supra and Benjamin A. Goldman,
The Truth about Where You Live: An Atlas for Action on Toxins and Mortality
(1991).
4 See Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards, supra note 1 and
Rebecca L. Calderon et al., Health Risks from Contaminated Water: Do Class and
Race Matter? 9 Toxicol. Ind. Health 879 (1993).
5 See Environmental Equity; supra note 2; Marion Moses, Eric S. Johnson & W.
Kent Angler, Environmental Equity and Pesticide Exposure, 9 Toxicol. Ind. Health
913 (1993) and Ken Sexton, Jenneth Liden & Barry L. Johnson, "Environmental
Justice": The Central Role of Research in Establishing a Credible Scientific
Foundationfor Informed Decision Making, 9 Toxicol. Ind. Health 686 (1993).
6 Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Racism in America? 206 Envt'l Prot. 25
(1991); Robert D. Bullard & Beverly H. Wright, The Politics of Pollution:
Implicationsfor the Black Community, XLVII Phylon 71 (1986); Robert D. Bullard
& Beverly H. Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity: Emergent
Trends in the Black Community, 12 Mid-Am. Rev. Sociol. 21 (1987) and Dick
Russell, Environmental Racism: Minority Communities and Their Battle against
Toxics, The Amicus Journal, Spr. 1989, at 22.
7 See Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the
Environmental Justice Movement, in Confronting Environmental Racism, supra
note 2, at 21.

Wigley & Shrader-Frechette: Environmental Racism 57
poor, minorities are also more likely to be politically disenfranchised.
Thus, they are typically less able to fight unwanted risks. This disability
could explain the disproportionate share of environmental threats that
minorities appear to bear. It is not necessary, however, to settle whether
race or socioeconomic status is a greater cause of environmental
inequities. Regardless of the precise cause, there is evidence of racist bias
in environmental decisionmaking, as this essay shows.
Because there is growing national concern that disparities in
environmental and health risks are related to race and socioeconomic
status, preventing environmental racism and promoting environmental
8
justice is now a top priority on the public health agenda of the U.S.
Environmental justice is the attempt to accord all people - regardless
of their race, ethnicity, class, age or gender - equal protection and
equal opportunity in matters of environmental degradation and
resource consumption. On Earth Day, 1993, President Clinton
announced a federal action plan to achieve environmental justice for all
Americans. On February 11, 1994, he signed Executive Order 12898
that directs each federal agency to develop an environmental justice
strategy for "identifying and addressing... disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies,
9
and activities on minority populations and low-income populations."
Here we argue that environmental injustice and racism occur not
only when policymakers violate minorities' rights to free informed
consent or equal treatment in siting decisions but also when risk
assessors use biased scientific methods whose policy consequences de
facto result in unjustified discrimination against people of color and
8 See Environmental Equity; supra note 2; Stephen C. Jones, EPA Targets
"EnvironmentalRacism, 'The National Law Journal Aug. 9, 1993, at 8; Paul Cotton,
Pollution and Poverty Overlap Becomes Issue, Administration Promises Action, 271
J.AMA 967 (1994); John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton to Order Effort to Make
Pollution Fairer,The New York Times, Feb. 10 1994, at Al; Marianne Lavelle, EPA
Responds to Concerns of Minorities on Cleanups, The National Law Journal, May 9,
1994, at A12 and Bud Ward, Environmental Racism Becomes Key Clinton EPA
Focus, 149 Safety & Health 183 (1994).
9 Executive Order 12898, § 1-101(reprinted Environment, May 1994, at 16).
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socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. We support our claim by
presenting a case study of the recently proposed Claiborne Enrichment
Center (CEC), a uranium enrichment facility near Homer, Louisiana.
We show that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Final
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the CEC is seriously flawed
in its general scientific methodology and logic. In our view, the
agency's EIS: provides inadequate arguments both for the plant and for
siting the polluting facility in a poor black community; does not
sufficiently explore other, less dangerous, energy alternatives; gives no
reasonable justification for eliminating potential alternative sites in more
affluent areas; improperly implements its own criteria for selecting an
appropriate host community; uses biased accident evaluations that
underestimate risks imposed on the black community; minimizes and
misrepresents normal operating risks of the CEC; and underestimates
costs and overestimates benefits. Because the EIS suffers from serious
methodological and logical inadequacies, using it as the basis for siting
is not justified. Moreover, we argue that risk assessors are neither
innocent nor ignorant of the fact that the flawed EIS encourages
imposing inequitable risk on socioeconomically disadvantaged
communities. As a result, using the methodologically biased EIS
appears to encourage unjustified discrimination against people of color.
Assessing the Risks of the Louisiana Facility
In January 1991, Louisiana Energy Services (LES) applied for a
license to build and operate a uranium enrichment facility, the CEC,
near Homer, Louisiana. The primary function of the proposed
installation is to produce, during its 30-year life, various grades of
enriched uranium for use in commercial nuclear power generating
stations in the U.S. The NRC used LES data and methods on the
proposed site to prepare an environmental impact statement for the
plant. Assessors analyzed the projected environmental impacts,
including potential health and safety risks, associated with the facility's
construction, operation, decontamination, and decommissioning. The
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EIS also discussed the purpose and need for the plant and the siteselection process.
What is the rationale for the facility?1 0 According to LES, as of
1990, the DOE supplied approximately 89% of enriched uranium
purchased in the U.S., while only 11% came from other suppliers.
However, by 1996, LES projects that 60% of the national demand for
enrichment services will be uncommitted to DOE suppliers and that,
by the year 2000, this share will grow to 70%.11 Owners of LES
believe that the increasing (uncommitted) demand provides an
opportunity for a competing company to enter the U.S. enrichment
market. Furthermore, the EIS argues that the LES facility is likely to be
an effective competitor, in part because the proposed plant will utilize
the gas centrifuge technology, which uses about 50 times less electrical
energy than the DOE's old gas diffusion technology. 12 In addition,
LES owners claim that the CEC: (1) will pressure other U.S.
enrichment suppliers to maintain competitive positions in the world
market, (2) will reduce national dependence on foreign suppliers, and
(3) will provide an opportunity to replace the older gas diffusion
13
process with an energy-efficient one.
After explaining the need for the CEC and presenting the siteselection process, the EIS gives a general description of the surrounding
environment, including local communities' socioeconomic
characteristics. 14 The projected site is in Claiborne Parish, a depressed
area with a high percentage of minority residents. Its racial/ethnic
composition is 53% white, 46% black and approximately 1%
American Indian, Asian and Hispanic. 15 Percentages are roughly the
same for Homer, a town in Claiborne Parish about five miles from the
site. However, two small communities hosting the proposed plant,
10 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1 Final Environmental Impact Statement
for the Construction and Operation of Claiborne Enrichment Center, Homer,

Louisiana 1-5 - 1-9 (1994) (hereafter EIS).
11
12
13
14

1 EIS,
1 EIS,
1 EIS,
1 EIS,

at 1-5.
at 1-5.
at 4-77.
at 3-93.

15

1 EIS, at 3-103.
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Center Springs and Forest Grove - about 0.25 and 1.25 miles,
16
respectively, from the site - are almost entirely African-American.
17
The EIS also ranks the area among the poorest in the U.S.:
Employment in Claiborne Parish... is generally low-wage
and low-skill. Per capita earnings for the residents is about
$5,800 per year.... The average for the broadly defined LES
labor market is only about $8,500 per year compared to the
national average of almost $12,800. These figures, in
particular the Claiborne Parish figures, makes it one of the
poorest regions in the United States as measured by per
capita earnings.
In terms of total per capita personal income, Louisiana is ranked
45th in the U.S., and Claiborne Parish is ranked in the bottom third of
its parishes. 18 Unemployment in the Parish is 8%, with "minority
unemployment" being "minimally 50% greater than white
unemployment." 19 The high-school-dropout rate in Claiborne Parish
is 47%.20 Besides being among the poorest in the nation, Homer and
the two black towns have both limited resources and fluctuating or
rising crime rates. Because "budgetary constraints have imposed hiring
freezes and have even resulted in the dismissal of police employees,"
law-enforcement resources have "come under strain" during periods of
higher-than-average crime. 2 1 Like other parts of the country, the
Homer area experiences "drug-related crime, including 'crack' cocaine
dealing, and drug-related burglaries, thefts, and robberies."22
After describing the main socioeconomic characteristics of the
proposed site, the EIS provides an assessment of the environmental
16 1 EIS, at xxvi.
17 1 EIS, at 3-109.
18 1 EIS, at 3-112.
19 1 EIS, at3-110&3-111.
20 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Draft Environmental Impact Statement
for the Construction and Operation of Claiborne Enrichment Center, Homer,
Louisiana xxiii (1993) (hereafter Draft EIS).
21 1 EIS, at 3-96.
22 1 EIS, at 3-96.
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consequences of the facility for both normal operations and postulated
accident conditions. Normal operation of the plant creates the potential
for radiological and nonradiological impacts. According to the EIS,
nonradiological impacts include, for example, increases in crime, higher
rental and home-purchase prices, and contaminant releases of
23
nonradiological substances to surface water, groundwater, and air.
Public radiological impacts of the CEC include atmospheric exposure
(to uranium from the uranium enrichment process lines and equipment
decontamination and maintenance), aquatic exposure (from radioactive
liquids released to surface water), and direct exposure (from storage
and transportation of UF6 cylinders). 2 4 The NRC bases its assessment
of radiological impacts, in part, on its review of similar enrichment
plants and on evaluation methods established in its regulatory
guidelines. 2 5 The EIS discussion of radiological impacts also includes a
risk analysis. It explains that consequences from potential accidents
"could include personal injury, health effects from acute exposure to
toxic chemicals, non-stochastic effects from acute radiation exposure,
26
and risk of latent cancer due to exposure to radioactive material."
The analytical procedures used in the CEC risk analysis involve "review
of potential accident initiators and related release mechanisms" and
"development of accident scenarios." 2 7 This identification of accident
initiators and scenarios is based on review of past experience in
European centrifuge plants, previous NRC-sponsored evaluations of
accident scenarios, and LES's description of projected equipment and
operations at the proposed facility. 2 8 Rather than a typical,
probabilistic risk assessment, the accident evaluation in the EIS is of a
29
"deterministic, non-probabilistic nature."
23 See 1 EIS, at 4-19 - 4-32.
24 1 EIS, at 4-36.
25 1 EIS, at 4-37ff.
26 1 EIS, at 4-46.
27 1 EIS, at 4-46.
28 1 EIS, at 4-46.
29 1 EIS, at 4-46.
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The EIS also presents a cost-benefit analysis. Benefits of the
proposed CEC include gains in regional employment, primarily in the
form of high-paying construction and operations jobs. Statewide gains
would result from the multiplier effect of these new employment
opportunities. The distribution of benefits, however, "is likely to be
concentrated in the middle income groups," and higher-income
households are expected to "benefit most from the income generation
process." 3 0 Local costs of the CEC include overtaxing of community
services and crowding of schools, hospitals or other public facilities.
According to the EIS, the largest potential impacts are to come from
local increases in crime, which will strain the police and justice systems.
Based on its evaluation of potential impacts from the facility, the
EIS concludes that the construction and operation of the enrichment
plant would not result in a significant impact on environment or human
health and that siting the CEC would not impose an environmental
injustice on poor minority communities. The EIS authors maintain that
radiological and nonradiological impacts resulting from routine
operations, as well as consequences of potential accidents, will be within
limits set by the NRC and EPA. 3 1 In response to the 1994 U.S.
Executive Order 12898, the NRC staff explicitly considered the issue
of environmental justice from two perspectives: (1) "Is the evidence that
LES selected the proposed CEC site based on racial considerations?"
and (2) "Will minority and economically disadvantaged populations be
disproportionately affected by the CEC?' '3 2 First, the EIS authors
claim that, because LES used no explicit racial considerations in its siteselection process, this process violated no norms of environmental
justice. 33 Although they admit that the CEC will affect those living
closest to it the most, the NRC assessors project no significant
environmental or health impacts as a result of the facility and conclude
30 1 EIS, at 4-78.
31 See, e.g., 1 EIS, at 4-45, 4-60 & 4-61.
32 1 EIS, at 4-34.
33 1 EIS, at 4-35.
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that "there will not be a disproportionate adverse impact on minority
and low-income populations." 3 4 As a result, the NRC staff maintains
that the proposed enrichment "facility is not an example of
environmental injustice." 35 Indeed, based on its cost-benefit analysis,
the EIS concludes that, "on balance, CEC should be a major
socioeconomic asset to Homer, Claiborne Parish, and neighboring
parishes." 36 If our arguments are correct, however, there may be reason
to doubt these claims.
Inadequate Assessment Arguments Showing Need for the Facility
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the EIS
must state the need for the proposed CEC. Yet, the discussion of need
is inadequate. For one thing, contrary to LES officials' assertion that the
facility will be a complementary supplier of enriched uranium, it may
jeopardize both government enrichment income and customers. 37 The
DOE and U.S. taxpayers now face the enormous costs of future
decontamination and decommissioning of old enrichment facilities,
environmental restoration of plant sites and deployment of new
enrichment technology. 3 8 DOE customers could help taxpayers

handle these costs. Yet, because the facility will be in direct competition
with those of DOE (government) suppliers, 3 9 it could take customers
away from the DOE. Hence, it could hinder the U.S. government's
handling of future expenses related to enrichment.
Further, the current federal enrichment strategy (that includes
privatizing the U.S. Enrichment Corporation and developing more
40
cost-efficient technologies) may eliminate the need for the facility.
34 1 EIS, at 4-35.
35 1 EIS, at 4-35.
36 1 EIS, at 4-86.
37 See National Energy Strategy (Part 2). Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); Energy Policy Act of 1992, P.L. 102-486, Oct. 24, 1992.
38 See id.
39 1 EIS, at 1-5.
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The DOE is committed to the Uranium-Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope
Separation (U-AVLIS) process. This means of enriching uranium costs
50% less than any other, including the centrifuge technology to be used
at the proposed CEC. 4 1 Although the U.S. government has not yet
proceeded with the commercialization of the U-AVLIS process, experts
testifying before Congress have indicated that the new technology can
be put in operation shortly after the year 2000 and in facilities whose
output will be much greater than the proposed CEC. 42 In addition,
the EIS acknowledges that "in 1993, the U.S. and Russia reached an
agreement which provides for the U.S. to buy Russian uranium." 4 3 As
the EIS admits, the uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons
will supply more than "50% of projected U.S. demand" during the first
15 years of CEC operation. 4 4 Given these U.S. strategies for
addressing current enrichment problems, it is questionable whether
there is a need for the proposed CEC facility.
The EIS also fails to show a need for the plant because it
inadequately discusses the status of the declining U.S. nuclear power
industry. A healthy nuclear industry is a necessary condition for
building any enrichment facility. According to the EIS, LES has
projected that requirements for enrichment services will begin to
increase significantly in the year 2000. 4 5 This projected increase,

however, is doubtful. The commercial reactor industry collapsed in the
1970s, 4 6 with the cessation or cancellation of all orders for new nuclear
generating facilities. Although utilities ordered 231 fission plants
through 1974, they canceled or indefinitely deferred all fifteen reactors
ordered after 1974 and over 100 other plants already ordered or under
40 See Environmental Policy Act of 1992 §§ 1502 & 1601.
41 See National Energy Strategy, supra note 37, at 41-142.
42 See idat 151.
43 1 EIS, at 1-5.
44 I EIS, at 1-7.
45 1 EIS, at 1-5.
46 See, e.g., John L. Campbell, Collapse of an Industry- Nuclear Power and the
Contradictions of U.S. Policy (1988).
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construction. No utility has ordered a new nuclear plant since 1978,
and virtually all U.S. commercial reactors now existing (or under
construction) will have ended their 30-to-40-year lifetime by the year
47
2004 - before the proposed LES facility will be fully operational.
The collapsed state of the commercial nuclear industry likely will
continue because many problems that precipitated it show no real signs
of being solved. Reasons for collapse include: (1) a sharp downturn in
expected electricity demand; (2) increased reactor costs, brought about
by inflation, extended construction times and unanticipated new
regulatory requirements; (3) public opposition and (4) instances of poor

management. 4 8 Another important factor that now hinders revival of
the industry is DOE's uncertain progress in siting a permanent
repository for high-level radioactive waste. 4 9 Utility officials believe

that many such difficulties will persist, at least, until after the beginning
of the next century. 5 0 In a 1990 report, the GAO interviewed no

utility officials who were willing even to consider purchasing a new
nuclear reactor before the beginning of the next century. 5 1 This
reluctance to consider fission-generated electricity -

primarily because

of strong public opposition and high financial risks for utilities - is
likely to continue. 52 Because of the current state of the U.S. nuclear
industry and the alternative technological strategy for providing the
nation's enrichment services, it is questionable whether there is a real
need in the U.S. for the LES enrichment facility.
See id, at 3; U.S. General Accounting Office, Electricity Supply: What Can Be
Done to Revive the Nuclear Option? Report to the Chairman, Environment, Energy,
and Natural Resources Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations,
House of Representatives 10, 23 (1989).
48 Id, at 14.
49 See Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty (1993); Nicholas Lenssen,
Confronting Nuclear Waste, in State of the World 1992 (Lester R. Brown ed. 1992)
and Electricity Supply, supra note 47, at 4.
50 See Electricity Supply, supra note 47, at 22-25.
51 U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Science: U.S. Electricity Needs and
DOE's Civilian Reactor Development Program, Report to Congressional Requesters 3
& 17(1990).
52 Lenssen, supra note 49.

47
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Inadequate Exploration of Other Energy Alternatives
Although NEPA requires a detailed analysis of alternatives to any
proposed facility, 53 the EIS provides no adequate discussion. The EIS
could include investigations of the status of (1) alternative non-nuclear
energy sources (e.g., solar, wind, geothermal); (2) other nuclear energy
sources (e.g., thorium-232 fission reactors 54 ); and (3) alternative
enrichment technologies (e.g., U-AVLIS). It includes a very brief
discussion of the U-AVLIS technology and, despite NEPA's
55
requirement, dismisses the need to consider such alternatives:
The environmental review of a license application focuses
on the proposal of the applicant and the goals of the
applicant. In a licensing proceeding, therefore, the
alternatives considered by the NRC must be connected to
the applicant's stated goals. Thus, the EIS need not discuss
the environmental effects of alternatives that are only
remote and speculative possibilities or that would not
accomplish the stated goals of the applicant.
The EIS states that the U-AVLIS "technology, when developed, could
have both environmental and economic advantages." Nevertheless, the
NRC accepts LES's rejection of the new technology because it is not
yet commercially available and would require LES to construct other
production facilities. 5 6 Also, regarding the DOE's plans for
developing the U-AVLIS technology, LES claims that, "Until DOE
demonstrates integrated systems reliability, decides on a deployment
plan and it is approved by Congress, there is no basis for any comparison with the CEC." 57 That is, contrary to DOE claims, the NRC
accepts the LES contention that the U-AVLIS technology is a remote
and speculative possibility. The NRC also appears to give primacy to
LES's proposed goals rather than to those of its own government.
53

1 EIS, at 1-1.

54 See Ivars Peterson, Accelerator Route to Nuclear Energy, Science News, Jan. 1,
1994, at 12.
55 2 EIS, at 1-259.
56 1 EIS, at 2-1.
57 Louisiana Energy Services, LES Project Financial Plan, Attachmt. D, at 8 (1992).
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Contrary to the LES and NRC claims, it is arguable that the UAVLIS technology is not a remote and speculative possibility and
deserves more consideration in the EIS. In 1991, the same year in which
LES applied for its license to build the CEC (to use the older
technology) William H. Young, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy,
58
affirmed the newer U-AVLIS process. He confirmed that:
DOE's current technology demonstration efforts for the
U-AVLIS process are fully funded and proceeding on
schedule for completion in September 1992 to support these
commercial decisions [regarding the technology s market
introduction].
Young stated that "a small AVLIS plant with a capacity of about 3
million separative work units (SWU)" could provide "initial production
in 1999. ,,59 Young also claimed that a larger plant could be built "with
a capacity of about 9 million SWUs at a cost of about $1,050 million,
in FY 1992 dollars, with initial production in 2000. ,, 60 The dates for
these newer-technology plants roughly correspond to the initial
production times of the proposed older-technology CEC. Moreover,
the fact that the DOE is not pursuing the outdated centrifuge
technology (used in the CEC) is evidence to suggest that U-AVLIS is
likely to be successful. Thus, even if the date for the U-AVLIS plants
were pushed back a couple of years, the new enrichment technology
would not be a remote and speculative possibility, unworthy of more
serious consideration.
Second, contrary to claims in the EIS, detailed analyses of energy
and enrichment alternatives may be relevant for assessing the stated
goals of an applicant, like LES, even if such alternatives obviously are
inappropriate to those aims. The applicant's goals are supposed to
promote the public good, not merely the corporation's interests, and
alternative projects may achieve this end better than an existing
58 National Energy Strategy, supra note 37, at 142.
59 National Energy Strategy, supra note 37, at 151.
60 Id.
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proposal. Given NEPA's requirement to promote the general welfare, it
is arguable that projects should be licensed only if they are in the public
interest. In order to determine whether an applicant's goals promote the
common good, the NRC should compare these aims with those of
other potential projects that may employ alternative technologies. For
example, although the U-AVLIS process may be inappropriate for
accomplishing the particular commercial aims of LES, this enrichment
alternative (and U.S. plans to utilize it) may make the LES project
unnecessary. If so, then the CEC would not promote the public good
because its siting would subject communities to unnecessary risks from
an expensive and outdated technology.
Inadequate Justification for Eliminating Potential North Carolina Sites
Another problem with the Louisiana EIS is its methodologically
questionable elimination of other potential areas for the site, particularly
those located within North Carolina. The EIS used a three-phased sitescreening process: (1) the identification of a candidate region; (2) the
determination of potential areas for the facility; and (3) the selection of
alternative locations. 6 1 However, this screening process presupposes
that all parts of (all sites within) a region may be rejected simply
because the region taken as a whole (most of the region) exhibits
unacceptable characteristics. As a result, phase two of the EIS screening
may have inappropriately excluded potential sites from consideration.
This is questionable because what is mostly or generally true of a whole
is not always true of its parts. The NRC authors seem to commit (what
is known as) "the fallacy of division." 62 For example, to argue that
because an automobile is poorly built, therefore every part of the
automobile is poorly built, is to commit this fallacy. Similarly, the EIS
commits this fallacy by excluding suitable North Carolina sites merely because they were within a larger region where many sites were
seismically unsuitable. Within North Carolina there is a large investor61 1 EIS, at 2-3.
62 See Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic 119 (7th Ed. 1986).
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owned electric utility service area (i.e., Duke Power Co.). Although
most of the area is in an unfavorable seismic zone, the EIS presents
maps indicating that part of this utility area is within a low seismic zone
(corresponding to earthquakes with an effective peak acceleration of less
than 0.49m/s2 ).63 However, it states that the "North Carolina and
South Carolina utility service areas were removed from consideration
because the effective peak acceleration of earthquakes exceeded
0.49m/s2." 6 4 It commits the fallacy of division and, without
justification, the EIS may have rejected locations (with low minority
populations) as seismically favorable as the chosen Louisiana site (within
a high African-American population). The following comments by the
NRC concerning the methodology of the screening process seem to
65
confirm this fallacious, potentially racist, mode of reasoning:
The purpose of a regional screening is to select a region for
more detailed review. It is acceptable to reject regions from
further review based on broad criteria, even though there
may be potential sites in the region that is rejected.
Similar fallacies occur in the EIS discussion of a favorable
transportation region for siting the CEC. The analysis is biased in
ignoring the fact that a North Carolina site is probably more suitable
for transportation purposes. The EIS was able to claim that the
Louisiana site was more desirable only because it ignored the facts that
a raw material source in Oklahoma is no longer operational, and owners
shut down one destination plant in Connecticut. Thus the Louisiana site
looks favorable only because the transportation analysis in the EIS is
seriously outdated. 6 6 The NRC authors acknowledge these two
shutdowns but nevertheless accept LES's calculations that ignore the
shutdowns and exclude potential North Carolina sites from the
favorable transportation region. The EIS states that "The Oklahoma
facility was operational when LES conducted its [draft] site selection.
63 See 1 EIS, at 2-5 (figure 2.1), 2-7 (figure 2.3) & 2-10 (figure 2.5).
64 1 EIS, at 2-8.
65 2 EIS, at 1-262.
66 1 EIS, at 2-4, 2-6.
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The fact that the facility has since shut down does not invalidate the
process." 67 NRC assessors make the questionable assumption that the
final EIS need not be state-of-the-art. But updated calculations,
excluding the facilities that are no longer operational, would result in
EIS employment of a transportation region that includes the Duke
Power Company's service area in North and South Carolina. This
simple correction would make any potential site within the North
Carolina service area more favorable (regarding transportation) than any
location in Louisiana, because it would be much closer to several major
product destination points. Yet the EIS justified the Louisiana site, with
its high minority population, rather than a Carolinas site, with a
potentially lower minority population.
Improper Implementation of Site-Selection Criteria
Environmental racism also appears to have influenced the EIS
conclusions and methods because investigators did not properly
implement their own criteria and procedures in the site-selection
process. Although they chose the African-American communities,
Center Springs and Forest Grove, to host the proposed CEC, assessors
included them neither in the site-solicitation process nor in scoring and
evaluation procedures. LES followed a three-phased screening process
to identify a suitable site for the enrichment facility. 6 8 Investigators at
each phase used a set of economic, technical, social and environmental
criteria. The first phase, mentioned in the last section, identified
geographical areas within the U.S. suitable for locating the plant. The
second and third screening processes for the proposed CEC consisted
of phases that focused on the selection of a final site in northern
Louisiana. LES began by soliciting community leaders "for their
interest in being the host site for a new manufacturing facility" and
requested them to use LES's criteria to "nominate potential sites."69
67 2 EIS, at 1-262.
68 1 EIS, at 2-3- 2-19.
69 1 EIS, at 2-11.
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Twenty-one solicited groups sent offers to LES. LES eliminated some
of these nominated communities through the use of additional criteria,
such as the need for the host citizens to have a "strong manufacturing
mentality." 7 0 LES then used a decisionmaking methodology of
"musts" and "wants" to further narrow the list of potential locations. 7 1
Site "musts" included meeting certain geologic and soil requirements.
Site "wants" included local support. 7 2 Investigators at this scoring
phase of the second screening process chose Homer, a town in
Claiborne Parish, Louisiana. In the final phase, LES researchers ranked
potential sites around Homer and emphasized their "want" for
73
community support and leadership regarding the proposed site.
They finally selected an area near Center Springs and Forest Grove, two
African-American communities located five miles from Homer.
Despite LES's attributing great importance to local community
support for the proposed facility, the site solicitation, scoring and
evaluation procedures did not involve the host communities, Center
Springs and Forest Grove, predominately black towns which are located
approximately .25 miles and 1.25 miles, respectively, from the
proposed CEC. EIS Investigators did not solicit opinion leaders from
these two towns. Instead, assessors canvassed leaders from Homer
(located 5 miles from the chosen site) and presented these officials with
site-selection criteria that allowed them to nominate potential sites
within other unsolicited communities. Thus, LES's criteria permitted
site proposals that undermined the purpose of the solicitation process.
Although the company's most important "wants" for evaluating
potential sites included local citizens' acceptance and leadership, the
site-selection process led LES's investigators to ignore the views of
community leaders from Center Springs and Forest Grove. 7 4 Because
70
71
72

1 EIS, at 2-13.
1 EIS, at 2-12.
1 EIS, at 2-15.

73

1 EIS, at 2-18.

74 See 1 EIS, at 2-16, table 2.2. See also Robert D. Bullard, Commentator No. 5,
in 2 EIS, at 1-20 and Robert D. Bullard, Overcoming Racism in Environmental
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the LES authors did not take into consideration the opinions of the
communities proposed as hosts of the plant, EIS investigators
improperly implemented their own site-selection criteria and
procedures. Indeed they used implementation criteria that appear to be
evidence of environmental racism.
Biased Accident Evaluations That Underestimate Risks
Environmental racism also may play a role in the EIS's biased
underestimation of accident risks associated with the proposed facility.
The EIS allegation that the CEC poses no significant threat to public
health and safety is highly questionable and likely minimizes the real
accident risk for at least three reasons: (1) The assessors performed no
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). (2) They based their conclusions on
largely subjective judgments formulated in purely qualitative language.
(3) Assessors used outdated empirical studies to draw their conclusions.
(4) They did not evaluate some worst-case accidents.
Regarding the first problem, NRC assessors admitted that their
conclusion about low accident risks "was based on the proposed design
of the facility" and "was of a deterministic, non-probabilistic
nature." 7 5 Drawing safety conclusions on the basis of the intended
design of a risky facility is highly questionable because assessors have
not checked empirically the theorized risks. Also, because virtually
nothing occurs with certainty but with some probability less than or
close to one, and because assessors estimate virtually all technological
hazards by means of PRA, 7 6 the deterministic evaluation (that
accident risk at the facility is low) of the EIS is highly questionable. If
analysts performed no PRA for the proposed CEC, then for any
potential accident, it is impossible to know reliably the probability of its
occurring. Hence, the EIS conclusion about low risks is unjustified.
Given assessors' well established "overconfidence bias," 77 especially in
Decisionmaking,Environment, May 1994, at 39.
75 1 EIS, at 4-46.
76 See Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (1991).
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assessing various nuclear-related risks, there is reason to believe that the
NRC underestimates the CEC risk.
Second, the NRC assessors likewise appear to have underestimated
the facility risks by virtue of the fact that they use subjective and
qualitative judgments to defend their conclusion about low risks. They
claim, for example, that operator errors (associated with inadequate
degassing of the lines) could result in dangerous "releases of relatively
small magnitude,"78 yet they give no probabilities for such accidents
and no justification for the predicted range of possible quantities of
materials that could be released. Instead, without citation, they say that
"surveys... have reported negligible worker doses." 7 9 How much is
"negligible?" Who did the surveys? Where were they published? Why
did no one perform epidemiological studies? Likewise, the EIS assessors
conclude that failure of containment in the centrifuges could result in
"minor health and safety consequences, " 80 yet they provide no
quantitative analysis of all relevant and probable accident pathways and
consequences. Unless they provide a PRA, they beg the question when
they claim that accident consequences are "minor." Similar instances of
qualitative and subjective conclusions, including begging the question,
occur throughout the EIS. On page 4-69, for example, the assessors
claim that releases of contaminants to the site will "be minimized," but
they give no specific level of contamination that they will avoid and
note merely "that necessary measures will be taken to meet" established
standards. Given that various types of operational monitoring of the site
take place at a variety of intervals - such as once a month and
semiannually - and given that LES must submit the results of its
environmental monitoring program to the NRC for review only once
every two years, 8 1 it appears possible that site operators will minimize
77 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability, in Judgment
Under Uncertainty 46-47 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.
1982); Burying Uncertainty, supra note 49, at 131 & 155-156.
78 1 EIS, at 4-53.
79 1 EIS, at 4-60.
80 1 EIS, at 4-53.
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accident risks and consequences, in part because there are very few and
only infrequent independent checks on facility operations.
Also, because of the largely qualitative (not quantitative), vague EIS
discussion about taking measures to meet standards, it appears likely
that the assessors minimized accident risks. Otherwise it would cite
quantitative PRA data for risk levels and guarantee that operators
would actually meet the standards. Instead assessors claim that
unspecified steps "will be taken" to meet standards. The EIS likewise
asserts: "design, controls, and administrative procedures will be utilized
to minimize the possibility of accidental releases" of contaminants from
the site. 82 Yet it provides no specific probabilistic guarantees of
minimal releases. Hence, there is again reason to believe that the NRC
underestimates accident risks, in part because its conclusions appear to
be based on vague, qualitative judgments. One wonders whether an
affluent white community would accept such assessments or whether it
would hire an expensive lawyer to fight construction.
The NRC assessors -

using LES data -

very likely also

underestimated CEC accident risks because they based their inductive
conclusions about transportation risks and accident scenarios in part on
old data, from 1977 and 1984.83 Employing eighteen-year-old and
eleven-year-old information, as a basis for predicting present and future
risks, probably misses a variety of possible accident scenarios. More
mishaps are likely to have occurred since those reported in the dated
documents. Moreover, the EIS assessors ignored some catastrophic
accident scenarios (and assumed they would never take place), merely
because they had "never occurred" in 32 years of enrichment-facility
experience and because there would be "redundant protection
' 4 Even redundant protections, however,
controls."8
often fall victim to

human error. Sixty to 90% of serious technological accidents
81

1 EIS, at 4-37.

82
83

1 EIS, at 4-70.
1 EIS, at 4-45 & 4-46.

84 1 EIS, at 4-54.
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(according to the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment) typically
involve human error. Also, an alleged accident rate of 0 in 32 years is
not necessarily low but is consistent with a failure rate as high as 1 in
100 years, for example. As elementary considerations of confidence
intervals shows, if the real probability of an accident were 1 in 100 per
year, or 1 every 100 years, then the probability of going 32 years
without an accident would be 72.5%. Yet, a risk of 1 in 100 is quite
high, four orders of magnitude higher than federal officials often
allow. 8 5 Indeed, such a rate would not support disclaimers about no
"significant threat to public health and safety" from the facility. 86
Perhaps the greatest source of underestimation of accident risks is
failure to provide evaluations of some worst-case accidents. Worst-case
scenarios likely would include autoclaves used in the feed, purification,
87
sampling and blending sections of the facility. As the EIS states:
Mechanical damage or thermal over-pressurization and
rupture of the feed cylinder and autoclave would produce
the largest potential release to the atmosphere for accidents
occurring inside the Separations Building.
88
In addition, the EIS claims:
The product sampling and blending systems utilize
heated autoclaves to liquify enriched UF6 . Failure modes
for these autoclaves would be similar to those hypothesized
for the feed autoclaves. Major failure of a heated cylinder
and the autoclave would release a large amount of UF6 to
the atmosphere.
Nevertheless, its authors admit that major "failure of the blending and
sampling autoclaves is not evaluated in the accident analysis." 8 9 The
EIS gives two reasons for ignoring this worst-case accident scenario:
85 See, e.g., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An
Assessment of Accident Risks in US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (1975);
Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality, supra note 76, at 71.
86 1 EIS, at xxi.
87 1 EIS, at 4-53.
88 1 EIS, at 4-54.
89 1 EIS, at 4-54.
7 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 55 [Winter 1996]

"major failure of a cylinder in an autoclave has never occurred with this
type of autoclave," and "diverse, redundant protection controls" will be
present. 90 But the fact that a major failure has never occurred tells us
nothing about how likely it is to take place in the future. The mistake
here seems to be that of confusing accident frequency with accident
probability. Low accident frequency never confirms low accident
probability. Accident frequency approaches accident probability only
91
when the time period of observed accident frequencies nears infinity.
Furthermore, the presence of diverse, redundant protection controls, in
accord with the NRC's "Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
design basis," 92 does not show that an accident occurrence is unlikely.
One must first establish the effectiveness of the protection controls, and
this requires in part a detailed PRA - which assessors have not
performed for the EIS. Similar objections also apply to the reasons
given in the EIS for not evaluating possible major failures of the feed
autoclaves. The EIS asserts that, "due to the presence of diverse,
redundant protection systems, the event was not considered credible
and is not analyzed in detail." 93 Thus, without sufficient justification,
the qualitative, deterministic, question-begging conclusions provide
neither an adequate analysis of worst-case accident scenarios nor the
requisite PRA. Indeed, the deterministic analyses in the Louisiana EIS
are typical of risk assessments performed in the 1950's and 60's. Since
then, probabilistic assessments have become the standard. One wonders
if an affluent white community would tolerate a facility whose EIS was
deterministic and not based on state-of-the-art PRA.

90 1 EIS, at 4-53.
91 Risk and Rationality, supra note 76, at 80-81.
92 1 EIS, at 4-53; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulation of Uranium
Enrichment Facilities, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,276
(1988).
93 1 EIS, at 4-53.
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Biased Estimates of Normal Operating Risks
Besides underestimating accident risks and ignoring state-of-the-art
PRA, the EIS also minimizes the health and safety impacts of the
facility. The NRC notes, for example, that groundwater contamination
is a possibility from the proposed plant. 94 Yet, the document provides
almost no quantitative determination either of possible groundwater
impacts or the associated risk probabilities and consequences.
Nevertheless, the risk might be substantial. Ninety percent of the 127
U.S. government (DOE) nuclear-related facilities have contaminated
groundwater that exceeds regulatory standards up to 1,000 times.
Virtually every state (in which a nuclear-related facility exists) has
criticized the federal government for not stopping health and safety
95
violations and for failure to obtain independent site monitoring.
Hence, U.S. experience with nuclear facilities suggests both that the
groundwater risk at the proposed CEC could be quite high, and
consequently that the qualitative EIS judgments very likely
underestimate. EIS authors comment that the potential impacts of
expected groundwater releases are "insignificant" in part because of "the
low solubility of uranium in water." 96 But this falsely assumes that
only soluble uranium poses groundwater contamination risk. Because
assessors did no PRA and ignored the probabilistic groundwater risk,
they drew vague, qualitative conclusions about its low magnitude and
therefore appear to have underestimated another real risk of the facility.
Assessors likewise claim that they expect "minimal" releases of
radioactive waste during decontamination of the facility, 97 yet the EIS
provides a PRA and a quantitative determination neither of this risk nor
its associated probabilities and consequences. Indeed, although there is
some European experience with decommissioning plants like the
CEC, 9 8 no one in the U.S. has ever accomplished full decontam94 1 EIS, at 4-72.
95 Burying Uncertainty, supra note 49, at 155.
96 2 EIS, at 1-267.
97 1 EIS, at 4-74.
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ination of an enrichment facility. As a result, positing low risks is largely
hypothetical. One important indicator that the alleged decontamination risks for the CEC could be substantial is the fact that the EIS
estimates the cost of decontamination at $518 million. 9 9 Other
independent experts, estimating the cost of decontamination for
existing U.S. enrichment facilities, have said that such costs either are
unknown or may be as high as $8 billion for some plants. 10 0 Also,
because full decontamination of a plant has never occurred, there are
sure to be hidden, unexpected costs. These expenditures are likely to
encourage greater risks (caused by efforts at cost control) and thus
greater acceleration of decontamination expenses and risks.
In addition to the subjective and qualitative treatment of risks from
contaminated groundwater and decommissioning, the Louisiana EIS
underestimates health and safety risks in numerous other areas. The
document ignores the cumulative effect of radiological releases by
virtue of its failure to calculate actual probabilistic estimates for this risk
and instead dismissing it.101 Similarly, the EIS authors admit
repeatedly that the facility may not be economical, 1 02 yet the
document never provides any analysis of the way that uneconomical
operations typically drive plant operators to take short cuts with respect
to safety. Indeed, the admissions that the plant may be uneconomical
should serve as a "red flag" to anyone who believes that operators are
likely to follow regulations, particularly in a situation where there are
limited profits to fund health and safety expenditures. The EIS
admissions - that the plant "would operate under most.... scenarios"
and that "operations would continue even if the plant cannot cover its
fixed costs" 103 - suggest that past experience with safety violations at
98

1 EIS, at 2-54 & 2-55.

99
100
101
102
103

1 EIS, at 4-76.
NationalEnergy Strategy, supra note 37, at 194.
1 EIS, at 4-69.
1 EIS, at 4-78 & 4-85.
1 EIS, at xxv,4-78 & 4-85.
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other U.S. nuclear facilities will be repeated at the LES plant. They also
suggest that CEC operators will ignore environmental regulations in the
face of uneconomical operations. Moreover, because the NRC will
review the facility monitoring program only biennially, there is reason
to believe that the EIS has underestimated probable health and safety
risks. One wonders if the LES and the NRC would attempt to impose
a marginally economical, risky facility on an affluent white community.
Underestimation of Costs and Overestimation of Benefits
While the EIS underestimates the risks and costs of the proposed
facility, it overestimates and biases proposed benefits of the CEC. This
overestimation and underestimation appears to be systematic in such a
way as to prejudice readers in favor of the proposed plant. For example,
in the EIS benefit-cost analysis for the CEC, assessors neither quantified
and costed numerous consequences nor included them in the analysis.
They minimized health effects, safety hazards, associated increases in
crime and the worsening of the economic burdens on the lowest
economic groups living nearby. Assessors briefly and qualitatively
discussed such effects and then excluded them from the benefit-cost
analysis. For example, the EIS estimates that potential radioactive doses
from liquid releases will be two to ten times higher for children and
infants than for adults 1 0 4 - and that the largest tissue doses from
atmospheric releases (from the facility) for maximally exposed infants
will be at least four times greater than for adults. 1 0 5 Yet its authors fail
to include the costs and inequities associated with such effects. As a
result, they systematically overestimate the facility's desirability.
Assessors likewise minimize cumulative costs associated with
radiological pollution, including health and safety-related effects on the
workers. They are omitted from the benefit-cost analysis, as are worstcase accidents. Such omissions clearly indicate both that the EIS is far
below the standards of PRA typically employed to assess proposed U.S.
104 1 EIS, at 4-42 & 4-44.
105 1 EIS, at4-41&4-42.
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facilities and that these omissions undercut EIS reliability. Despite all
these increments of imposed risk - including the inequitable risk on
infants and children and the absence of a threshold for radiation risk or
damage - the benefit-cost calculations include no figures for the
health effects of any radioactive pollution. Given the admission
(mentioned earlier) that the plant may be unprofitable, EIS exclusion of
broad classes of costs suggests that it may be even more massively
uneconomical. Once one calculates the social costs of omitted inequities
and environmental burdens, the rationale may become even more
problematic. If owners and operators had to fight an affluent,
nonminority community, it is obvious that total costs would make it
prohibitive. Such economic considerations suggest that environmental
racism may well have played a key role in plans to build the center.
Not only does the EIS appear to underestimate facility costs
because of excluding many important economic, medical,
environmental and social factors, but it also overestimates benefits. For
example, it presupposes that economic benefits will flow from the CEC
during its 30-year life, even though the U.S. commercial nuclear
program actually came to a standstill in the mid-70s. If most U.S.
reactors will have ended their useful life by the beginning of the next
century, when the proposed facility will open, then it is questionable
whether many economic benefits will flow from the plant. The EIS also
is problematic in claims that many secondary economic benefits will
106
arise from the infusion of wages and associated construction activity.
Assertions about secondary economic benefits may be invalid because
most of the facility-related positive impacts will go to the middle, not
the lower, economic classes. 107 On the negative side, as assessors
recognize, crime will increase and property values will increase, but not
in areas affected by drugs and crime. 10 8 If economic boons of the
facility cause greater social inequities, then the "hidden economy" of
106 1 EIS, at 4-79 - 4-83.
107 1 EIS, at 4-78.
108 1 EIS, at 4-31, 4-79 & 4-83. See also Draft EIS, at 4-80.
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the underworld may divert potential secondary benefits into crime
rather than economic growth. In other words, if the regional economic
infrastructure cannot use the secondary economic benefits associated
with new construction and increased employment from the CEC, then
criminal networks could divert these monies to create secondary
economic burdens. Meanwhile the host community will need explicit
and increased government expenditures in order to deal with problems
that the CEC exacerbates. Because the NRC authors never quantified
and included the additional and serious costs of drug trafficking,
increased crime, exacerbated inequities and so on, the EIS has
underestimated the social costs associated with the enrichment facility
and overestimated alleged secondary economic benefits. Indeed, there
may be an excess of secondary economic burdens. The presumed
positive benefit-cost ratio in the EIS is the product of numerous
qualitative, vague and subjective judgments. It is not the result of a
comprehensive quantitative analysis. If the CEC induces extreme
negative social impacts, then the authors ought not have used standard
multipliers for secondary economic benefits. The economic
consequences of the proposed facility may actually require the use of
divisors for secondary economic benefits.
Apart from the alleged higher-order impacts of the proposed plant,
many primary economic benefits said to come from it are highly
questionable. For example, the Draft EIS asserts (without evidence and
any quantification) that "for CEC most goods and services (excluding
the centrifuges and related extremely specialized equipment) can
probably be procured within the state." 109 If builders guaranteed that
they would obtain, within the state, particular amounts of specific
goods and services, then it would be reasonable to claim these benefits
of the plant. Because there is no such guarantee in the EIS, such benefits
are purely hypothetical. Moreover, the educational, social, financial and
industrial problems of the region and the state could undercut many
goods and services that the proposed facility might provide. It appears
109 Draft EIS, at 4-75.
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that economically and socially disenfranchised residents of Louisiana
are being asked to bear the CEC burden of radiological damage,
despite the questionable socioeconomic consequences of the facility.
Ethical Connections: Assessment Methods and Racism
Because the Louisiana EIS suffers from serious methodological and
logical inadequacies, the attempt to use it to site the CEC installation is
not justified. Given that minorities and socioeconomically
disadvantaged communities would host the proposed facility, using the
methodologically flawed and biased EIS as grounds for licensing the
plant would result in unjustified discrimination against these hosts. In
other words, the proposed siting of the facility is an example of
environmental injustice and racist bias in environment-related
decisionmaking. Environmental injustice occurs not only when
policymakers explicitly violate minorities' rights to free informed
consent or equal treatment but also when assessors employ biased,
allegedly scientific methods whose consequences de facto result in
discrimination against people of color or against socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups. If the CEC assessment were not biased in some
of the ways outlined earlier, it would be less likely that the document
could be used to justify siting the facility in a poor minority
community. The EIS conclusions thus appear racist and indefensible to
the degree that they have increased the likelihood of an inequitable risk
imposition. Using the EIS conclusions to justify this Louisiana site
selection likewise seems less defensible to the degree that such a
selection would not occur within an affluent white community. The EIS
methods are more defensible to the extent that they are equally likely
to be used, regardless of the racial and economic characteristics of the
proposed host community. In other words, siting the Louisiana CEC
appears to be racist and ethically unjustifiable to the degree that the
biased assessment is designed precisely to sanction imposing an
inequitable risk on a poor black community. The siting is unjustified to
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the degree that assessment methods are not independent of whether the
host community is black or white, poor or wealthy.
Of course, objectors could argue that the social and industrial
agents - who are using a methodologically flawed assessment to
justify siting the Louisiana enriched uranium facility - are not
knowingly using a biased analysis that encourages racism and an
inequitable risk btirden. However, it is unlikely that the NRC assessors
are unaware of tti consequences of using a flawed EIS to site a
dangerous facility in a poor minority community. For one thing, public
controversy over anything related to radiation is well known, especially
to people in the nuclear industry. 1 1 0 Hence, the NRC and the
promoters of the Louisiana plant are unlikely to be strangers to
radiation-related conflicts. Social scientists also have documented
extensively the fact that it is more difficult to site risky facilities in
wealthy than in poor areas. 1 1 1 Of course, if the actors involved in using
the flawed assessment to promote the CEC are ignorant of these socialscientific data, then they may be innocent of environmental injustice or
racism, even if their actions help impose inequitable and involuntary
risks on a poor black community. 1 1 2 Even if the authors of the
Louisiana EIS and the accident analysis are acting in ignorance of the
racist consequences of their assessments, however, they may not be free
from ethical responsibility. All scientists and researchers have duties to
promote objectivity and to protect the public welfare. 1 1 3 They have
obligations to know how to do research and how to conduct it without
obvious bias. For example, they have duties to know how to eliminate
110 See, e.g., National Research Council, Building Consensus through Risk
Assessment and Management of the Department of Energy's Environmental
Remediation Program (1994).
11 Risk and Rationality, supra note 76, at 72-74; Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette,
Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology Ch. 7 (1984).
112 For discussions of consent in this case, see Daniel C. Wigley & Kristin S.
Shrader-Frechette, Consent, Equity, and Environmental Justice: A Louisiana Case
Study, in Faces of Environmental Racism (Laura Westra & Peter Wenz eds. 1995).
113 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Ethics of Scientific Research Ch. 2-5 (1994) and
Ethical Issues in Scientific Research (Edward Erwin, Sidney Gendin & Lowqell
Kleiman eds. 1994).
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or improve outmoded, deterministic models of accident analyses. They
have duties not to do perfect research but to avoid the obvious flaws
that almost any expert practitioner would recognize as poor science. In
the Louisiana EIS, at best, assessors appear to have neglected their
duties to use current research methods. If they have erred in this way,
then they are at least partially responsible for the racist consequences
that their assessments appear to condone.
Those who object to our thesis might also claim that flaws in the
EIS are independent of the fact that the proposed host for the facility is
a poor black community. In other words, they might object that sloppy
science occurs everywhere, that there is no basis for believing it is
intentional. On the contrary, the EIS bias and racism appear to be
neither accidentally related nor independent. One reason is that, as we
argued earlier, EIS assessors rejected potential sites for fallacious reasons
and used outdated transportation calculations. The authors ignored
more convenient facility sites (closer to distribution points and
associated with cheaper transportation costs) that may have been in
more affluent white communities. In disregarding locations that fit
their own stated criteria, the assessors appear to have preferred a site in a
disadvantaged area over one that more closely matched their claimed
selection criteria. Also, as we argued above, investigators failed to
choose host communities that satisfied stated criteria for site
solicitation, scoring and evaluating. Moreover, as we have argued,
assessors were able to underestimate the risks associated with the
Homer facility because they used outmoded, 25-year old, qualitative,
deterministic accident analysis. But both LES investigators and the
authors of the assessment know that they have obligations to recognize
or correct such flaws. After all, assessors have several decades of
methodological "know how" behind them. Since at least 1970,
scientists have been preparing and defending EISs and risk analyses.
NEPA and its EIS requirements are 26 years old. Those involved in
environmental impact assessment and PRA, especially in controversial
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areas of technology, can implement state-of-the-art assessments. 114 For
all these reasons, use of several outdated procedures does not appear
typical. Therefore, there seems to be dependence between assessment
bias and the attempt to site a facility in a poor black community. By
failing to follow their own site-selection norms, assessors reveal the
dependence between their biased analyses and siting the facility in a
minority community. Further, it is unlikely that they would try to use
outmoded deterministic techniques in an EIS for a facility near an
urban, affluent, white area. Corporate managers, at least, know that
well-to-do residents (or their attorneys) are well aware of the legal PRA
standards. Indeed, PRA -

not deterministic analysis -

has been the

115
norm at least since 1983 and the famous risk assessment "Redbook."
Given established PRA and EIS standards, failure to follow them
suggests more than accident or ignorance.
If our analysis is correct, then EIS authors and agents promoting the
facility are acting neither innocently nor ignorantly by helping to
impose a serious risk on a poor black community. Consequently, they
appear to be behaving in a reprehensible way for at least three
fundamental ethical reasons: Might does not make right; the end does
not justify the means; and site promoters err in proposing the facility
under conditions that violate traditional standards of procedural justice.
We discuss each in order.
Actions are ethically justifiable because they are in accord with
justice, recognized duties or the greater good. They are not justifiable
merely because some people - like those attempting to site the CEC
facility - are able to overpower others or to take advantage of them.
Because moral and legal rights to equal protection are not contingent on
socioeconomic status or power, those who employ flawed assessments
(either knowingly or through culpable ignorance) are responsible for
consequences of environmental injustice. They are accountable

114 National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication Ch. 3, 6 & 7
(1989).
115 See, e.g., National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal
Government (1983).
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whenever their analyses help to sanction inequitable risk impositions on
people who are less able than others to resist the imposition. Taking
advantage of those less able to defend their rights is never morally
acceptable. Indeed, if it were defensible, then might would be right,
and there would be neither ethics nor law but only the ability of the
powerful to prey on the powerless.
Proponents of the facility might object, of course, that the plant will
bring economic benefits to the country and the region as a whole. They
might say that this "greater good" justifies any apparent inequities. In
other words, CEC advocates might claim that the end justifies the
means. Such an argument is problematic for at least four reasons. First,
we showed that because there is no clear need for the facility, its
economic benefits are likely to be illusory. Second, we argued that the
proposed technology is not "state of the art" and indeed is likely to
harm U.S. interests. Third, we indicated that because the assessment
underestimates costs and overestimates benefits, the facility may well
be an uneconomical operation in which site managers "cut corners." All
three reasons suggest that, even on purely economic and political
criteria, the CEC is not likely to lead to the greater good or important
economic benefits. Of course, it may benefit the multinational
corporation and its shareholders who control LES. Benefitting them at
the expense of citizens (whose DOE uses more advanced uranium
enrichment technology), however, is hardly a greater good. Hence, it is
difficult to argue that the end (corporate benefits) justifies the means
(inequitable risk imposition). The end does not appear to promote what
is good for the majority of citizens. But even if the end (siting the
facility) were good for the greatest number of people, this fact might
not justify promoting the CEC. If black Louisianans' rights to equal
treatment could be compromised whenever the majority might benefit,
then there would be no moral rights at all. Rights would be only a
matter of expediency, something to be granted when convenient. But
moral and legal rights are not matters of expediency. Citizens in
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impoverished, rural or black communities have as much right to equal
consideration as those in wealthy, urban or white communities. Thus, it
is not ethically justifiable to sacrifice minorities' or poor people's basic
moral rights - without their consent or compensation - for the good
of the whole.
If assessors and promoters are acting in neither innocence nor
ignorance by using a flawed assessment to encourage the imposition of
inequitable risk on a poor black community, then they also appear to be
behaving unethically, in part because Claiborne Parish citizens probably
have fewer resources than others to detect flaws in the assessments. To
the degree that socioeconomic deprivation and racism keep them from
recognizing and protecting their interests, then biased assessments and
site-selection procedures contribute to violations of procedural justice.
(Procedural justice specifies legitimate procedures by which transactions
among people take place; the procedures must be fair, avoid cheating or
stealing, and so on. 1 16) Because the assessment includes so many
methodological flaws that help to sanction siting the facility, and
because local residents likely are less able (than persons in more
privileged communities) to recognize such flaws, the EIS procedures
violate standards of procedural justice. And if they violate standards of
procedural justice at the expense of minorities, then promoters appear
to violate ethics in helping to create a situation of environmental racism.

116 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974); John Rawls, A Theory of
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Conclusion
We conclude that the NRC's EIS fails in at least seven respects and
all contribute to inequitable imposition of risks on a black community:
* It provides inadequate arguments showing the need for
the enrichment plant, as required by NEPA, and for siting it
in a poor black community.
* The NRC does not sufficiently explore other, less
dangerous energy alternatives.
* It gives no reasonable justification for eliminating
potential alternative sites in more affluent, white areas.
* It ignores the consent of the proposed black host
community by using inconsistent criteria for site selection.
The NRC utilizes biased accident evaluations that
*
underestimate risks imposed on the black community.
0 It minimizes and misrepresents normal operating risks of
the facility.
• The EIS underestimates the costs and overestimates the
benefits of the enrichment center.
Because the EIS falls victim to all these flaws, and because the
assessors likely are neither innocent nor ignorant regarding the
contribution of these errors to imposing an inequitable risk on a poor
black community, we conclude that the CEC assessment contributes to
environmental racism.

